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This paper examines the Canadian Senate’s role within the context of Canada’s 
federal parliamentary system; and argues for reform to address the democratic 
deficit, western alienation, and political gridlock.  The need for an upper legislative 
chamber is established by the Senate’s functions of legislative review and regional 
representation.  Numerous major reform proposals are evaluated, focusing 
specifically on the selection of Senators, the composition of the Senate and its 
power to veto legislation.  Ultimately, it is difficult to reconcile the Westminster 
principle of majority rule with a democratized Senate.  Therefore, a Senate with 
curtailed veto powers and more equal provincial government representation 
through bureaucratic delegations is recommended.  Nonetheless, Justin Trudeau’s 
recent Senate reform measures remain unassessed due to their relative infancy. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Combining American federalism with British parliamentary government, the 
Fathers of Confederation established the Senate as the upper house of Canada’s 
bicameral Parliament.  Modeled after the British House of Lords, the Senate serves 
as “an older, conservative influence” on the legislative process,1 counterbalancing 
representation by population in the House of Commons.  Senators are appointed by 
the Governor General on the advice of the Prime Minister,2 while seats are 
distributed largely in accordance with the principle of equal regional, not 
provincial, representation.3  Both houses of Parliament possess the power of 
legislative initiative, with the exception of money bills which must originate in the 
                                                 
1Cochrane, Blidook, and Dyck, Canadian Politics: Critical Approaches, 596-97. 
2Constitution Act, C. IV “Legislative Power,” s. 22. 
3Constitution Act, s. 22. 
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House of Commons.4 Although the Senate can only delay constitutional 
amendments by a maximum of 180 days,5 it maintains an absolute veto over all 
other legislation since the approval of both houses is required for passage.6 
 
Despite the important legislative role of the Senate, John N. Turner observes that 
Canadians “feel that the Senate has outlived its usefulness and has become a 
superfluous appendix to the political system.”7  This is unsurprising given an 
appointments system effectively controlled by the Prime Minister.  Senators lack a 
democratic mandate and are hampered by political patronage in their ability to 
represent the regions of Canada, an issue that is especially apparent in the western 
provinces.  As both houses of parliament technically wield equal legislative power, 
but with minor exceptions, political gridlock pits the unelected Senate against the 
democratic House of Commons.  Interestingly, despite hundreds of proposals and 
numerous failed attempts at reform, the Senate has essentially remained unchanged 
since Confederation. Nonetheless, the Canadian Senate serves the necessary 
functions of legislative review and regional representation, but to address the 
democratic deficit, western alienation, and political gridlock, this paper argues that 
reforming the upper house is necessary.  
 
 
The Senate: Raisons d’Être 
 
The Senate today serves the especially important functions of legislative review 
and regional representation that distinguishes itself from the House of Commons, 
and justifies its existence as the upper house of Parliament.  In the initial years 
following Confederation, the first Prime Minister of Canada, Sir John A. 
Macdonald, described the Senate “as a body of ‘sober second thought’ that would 
curb ‘democratic excesses’ in the elected House of Commons.”8  Freed from the 
pressure of facing electoral challenge, senators focus more on the non-ideological 
task of reviewing and improving technical aspects of legislation, which “has 
become one of the Senate’s most important roles over the years.”9  R. A. MacKay 
concurs with this view, emphasizing the importance of independent and 
uncontroversial scrutiny of legislation,10 as does F. A. Kunz, who highlights the 
Senate’s contributions to policy development through studies and committee 
work.11  A notable example is the Kirby Report on health care, which made an 
                                                 
4Constitution Act, s. 53. 
5Constitution Act, s. 31. 
6Constitution Act, s. 55. 
7Turner, "The Senate of Canada- Political Conundrum," 57.  
8“Sober Second Thought.” 
9Cochrane et al, 597. 
10MacKay, The Unreformed Senate of Canada, 110. 
11Kunz, The Modern Senate of Canada: A Re-appraisal, 1925-1963, 265-66. 
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impact on guaranteed maximum wait times.12  It is also important to note the federal 
nature of the Canadian state, with powers divided between federal and provincial 
authorities.13  Randall White asserts that this division of powers necessitates an 
equal role for each of the provinces “regardless of disparities in population and 
‘natural’ economic power” in the federal legislative process,14 especially in areas 
of concurrent jurisdiction.  These functions differentiate the Senate from the more 
politicized and populist House of Commons, which is partisan by nature and is 
comprised of elected members who represent individual electoral districts across 
Canada.15 
 
Although the Senate is historically rooted in the defense of private property rights, 
abolition of the Senate is an unconvincing alternative to proposals for reform.  
Former Prime Minister Macdonald insisted that only a bicameral system could 
protect the rights of minorities,16 but was in fact primarily interested in 
safeguarding private property, “as the rich are always fewer in number than the 
poor.”17  Even today, Senators must meet a property requirement of $4,000,18 while 
Colin Campbell observes the Senate’s illegitimate defense of corporate interests, 
and advocates for its abolition as democratic reform would result in political 
impasse. Nonetheless, Michael Lusztig remarks that the role of the British House 
of Lords in balancing interests of the aristocracy and the commons has been 
rendered anachronistic through democratization.19  Similarly, recent senatorial 
appointments in Canada have become more diverse and have seen more women 
appointed to the Senate, providing a wider perspective.20  Many individuals such 
as Goldwin Smith and the New Democratic Party (NDP) call for the abolition of 
the Senate,21 but even current NDP Member of Parliament, Don Davies, is hesitant 
to toe the party line.  Although there remains a clear deficiency in the Senates 
structure, its aforementioned functions cannot be replicated in the House of 
Commons, establishing the need for an upper legislative chamber. 
 
 
 
                                                 
12MacLeod and Chodos, “The Senate Committee Study.” 
13Constitution Act, C. VI “Distribution of Legislative Powers.” 
14White, Voice of Region, 63. 
15Constitution Act, C. IV “Legislative Power,” s. 37. 
16Parliamentary Debates on the Subject, 44. 
17Macdonald, October 11, 1864, quoted in “Hewitt Bernard’s Notes,” 98. 
18Constitution Act, s. 23 (4). 
19Lusztig, “Federalism and Institutional Design,” 39-40. 
20Cochrane et al, 600. 
21Barnes et al., “Reforming the Senate of Canada: Frequently asked Questions,” 28; “How Not to 
Reform the Senate.” 
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Selection of Senators: The Democratic Deficit and Political 
Accountability 
 
Being appointed on the advice of the Prime Minister, Senators lack a popular 
mandate, while citizens are unable to hold Senators accountable.  It is difficult to 
justify the Senate’s great legislative powers without any mechanism to ensure the 
Senators’ political accountability to Canadian citizens.  The appointment system 
lacks transparency, and is often an exercise in political patronage, as senatorial 
vacancies are mostly filled by “party hacks,” characterizing the Senate as a “home 
for the aged” and “pension scheme for retired party warriors.”  Identifying the 
corporate connections of many Senators, Campbell also criticizes the “one-sided 
review which takes place in a legislature created by a political system which bends 
over backwards to ensure that business has preferential access to the policy 
process.”  More recently, Senators Mike Duffy, Patrick Brazeau, and Pamela 
Wallin have been accused of illegitimate expense claims,22 and despite internal 
disciplinary action by the Senate, voters have no opportunity to hold them 
accountable at the ballot box. 
 
The election of Senators may improve political accountability, but it may also 
worsen political deadlock, while proposals calling for provincial appointment offer 
an imperfect alternative.  An elected Senate has been proposed by the Macdonald 
Commission,23 the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and of the House of 
Commons on Senate Reform,24 and the Alberta Select Special Committee on 
Senate Reform.25  Depending on the electoral system adopted, smaller political 
parties not currently represented could be elected to the Senate, as current and past 
Prime Ministers mostly make partisan appointments,26 while left wing parties 
boycott the Senate for ideological reasons.27  However, supported by greater 
electoral legitimacy, the Senate could be emboldened to take a more active 
legislative role, reversing its tradition of self-restraint and increasing the potential 
for stalemate between the houses of Parliament.  Frederick C. Engelmann argues 
that “a double instead of the present single popular mandate…flies in the face of 
the principle of majority rule,”28 Instead he recommends a German Bundesrat style 
system of appointment by provinces.29  Alternatively, the Prime Minister could 
make nominations with provincial input, such as the case of Alberta and its Senate 
                                                 
22“A Chronology of the Senate Expenses Scandal.”  
23Macdonald, “Royal Commission on the Economic Union.” 
24Canada, Parliament, Senate and House of Commons, Special Joint Committee of the Senate and 
of the House of Commons, Special Joint Committee on Senate Reform. 
25Anderson, “Strengthening Canada, Reform of Canada’s Senate.”  
26Albinski, “The Canadian Senate: Politics and the Constitution,” 380. 
27Cochrane et al, 598. 
28Engelmann, "A Prologue to Structural Reform," 668.  
29Engelmann, 673. 
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nominee elections.30  However, a provincial appointment system does not resolve 
the issue of political patronage; this system simply transfers the problem from the 
federal to the provincial level. 
 
To combat the effects of patronage, Justin Trudeau’s Liberal government 
implemented a merit-based system of non-partisan appointments through the 
newly-established Independent Advisory Board for Senate Appointments,31 yet this 
is a stop-gap solution while its efficacy remains to be seen. 
 
 
Composition of the Senate: Western Alienation 
 
The Senate has failed to effectively represent regional interests, especially those of 
the western provinces, which have historically had an estranged and difficult 
relationship with Ottawa.  For some years since joining Confederation, the Western 
provinces “did not have equal representation with the other three regions in the 
Senate,”32 while feeling “exploited and treated as an economic colonial hinterland 
of central Canada.”33  This sentiment persists in the 21st century; policies such as 
the National Energy Programme are still viewed as excessive federal control over 
western resources for the benefit of the east.34  It is difficult to ignore the fact that 
Prince Edward Island has ten Senators representing a population of 512 thousand, 
while over 4.8 million British Columbians are represented by only six Senators.35 
36  As a result, “the prevailing western Canadian sentiment is a determination to 
remove all vestiges of its historical colonial relationship with central Canada,”37 
with western provinces adamant in their desire for reform. 
 
Alberta’s “Triple-E Senate” proposes elected and equal representation of provinces, 
but partisanship may remain an issue; the appointment of non-partisan bureaucrats 
offers an interesting alternative.  Equal representation similar to the US Senate 
would allow for enhanced provincial representation regardless of population.  
However, Paul C. Weiler argues that “[e]lected senators will feel precisely the same 
pressures to dampen expression (and votes) of regional dissent as MPs do now.”38  
This suggests that western Liberals and cabinet ministers would not want to follow 
James Richardson ⸺ who disagreed with the party on official language policy ⸺ 
into political exile.  Province-wide elections could potentially be expensive, and 
                                                 
30Alberta Senatorial Selection Act. 
31Canada, “Assessment Criteria.”  
32McKenzie, “Western Alienation in Canada,” 2. 
33McKenzie, 2. 
34McKenzie, 8. 
35Statistics Canada, Table 051-0001. 
36Constitution Act, s. 21.  
37Weiler, "Confederation Discontents and Constitutional Reform," 255. 
38Weiler, 264. 
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senatorial candidates would likely rely on the support of political parties to fund 
campaigns. Thus, Senators would largely vote according to the party line, as evident 
in the Australian Senate in which Senators “subordinate regional interests to 
partisan considerations.”39  However, the German Bundesrat model of appointed 
⸺ instead of elected non-partisan delegations of the provincial bureaucracy ⸺ 
could ensure an articulation of provincial interests consistent with provincial 
leadership, and “[g]ive Canada one capability it now lacks: a place in which 
representatives of federal and provincial bureaucracies could meet regularly.”40  A 
distribution of seats weighted according to provincial population sizes, but skewed 
to benefit smaller provinces could also be especially appealing to the western 
provinces. 
 
 
Powers of the Senate: Political Gridlock 
 
The unelected Senate may reject the democratic will of the House of Commons by 
vetoing legislation, especially when different political parties control majorities in 
each of the two legislative chambers.  Between 1867 and 1960, the Senate, in most 
instances controlled by the opposition, exercised its veto on over 100 bills,41 such 
as the Old Age Pensions bill in 1925.  MacKay contends that the Senate never really 
goes against the democratic will when clearly expressed, as the “appointed upper 
house labours under the handicap that it has no political foundation.”42  Recent 
experiences suggest otherwise.  The Goods and Services Tax would not have passed 
had Mulroney not made the controversial move to advise the appointment of eight 
additional Senators.43  A bill requiring sexual assault law training for judges 
presently being considered in the Senate is also being blocked through delay tactics 
despite unanimous approval in the House of Commons.44 This suggests that despite 
Mackay’s observations, the threat of an absolute veto by the undemocratic Senate 
is not merely theoretical, but real; a reliance on the self-restraint and stasis of 
agency is poor design. 
 
Retaining the power of absolute veto would require the strengthening of the 
Senate’s mandate, but reconciliation with the Westminster principle of majority 
rule may prove challenging, even with the reduced power of a suspensive veto.  A 
case in point is the Australian Senate, which operates as an elected upper chamber 
that may veto bills passed by the lower house.  Engelmann draws attention to the 
Australian constitutional crisis of 1975, in which the “deadlock-resolving 
                                                 
39Lusztig, 43. 
40Engelmann, 673.  
41MacKay, 62. 
42MacKay, 62. 
43Cochrane et al, 602. 
44“Globe Editorial.”  
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mechanism of the Australian constitution blew a fuse” and resulted in “the first 
dismissal of a government in the history of first-world British parliamentary 
government since the dismissal of the Fox-North ministry by George III in 1783.”45  
He further elaborates that “the mitigation of the suspensive veto may well be 
drowned out by the partisanship of senators,” as Senators could still employ the 
suspensive veto, or even delaying tactics to pressuring a government enjoying the 
confidence of the lower house into a snap election.46  An alternative proposal is a 
weakened variation of the German Bundesrat.47  The Senate would have no power 
to veto federal matters, preserving the principle of responsible government.  
However, it would maintain a veto on matters of joint or overlapping jurisdiction, 
allowing for provincial input.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Despite numerous attempts at reform, the Senate of Canada has remained largely 
unchanged since Confederation.  Some advocate for outright abolition, arguing that 
the Senate undermines democracy, but this paper takes the position that an upper 
legislative chamber should be preserved as its role in legislative review and regional 
representation are crucial and fundamentally distinct from that of the House of 
Commons.  This paper further suggests that reforms should be made to address the 
particularly pertinent issues of the democratic deficit, western alienation, and 
political gridlock.  There is no single perfect solution that could resolve all three 
issues, and it is particularly difficult to reconcile majority rule with a democratized 
Senate.  Nonetheless, this paper ultimately favors a Senate likened to a weakened 
variation of the Bundesrat system as Engelmann proposed. 
 
Furthermore, this paper acknowledges limitations in its assessment of Senate 
reform.  A comparative approach could be taken to further assess how upper 
legislative chambers function in various political systems.  The merits of abolition 
could also be given more attention, instead of assuming the suitability of 
bicameralism, while the efficacy and relevance of unicameral systems could be 
evaluated.  An alternative approach could be taken to analyze each reform proposal 
as a whole.  Finally, this paper is unable to make a proper assessment of Justin 
Trudeau’s reforms due to their relative infancy, and further research will be needed 
to study their implications on the operation and behavior of the Senate. 
 
                                                 
45Engelmann, 668-669. 
46Engelmann, 669-670. 
47Engelmann, 673. 
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